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Abstract:  
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method allows this and thereby it can measure prospect theory’s entire utility function. Consequently, we can 
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in an experiment and obtained support for prospect theory. Utility was concave for gains and convex for losses 
and there was substantial loss aversion. Both utility and loss aversion were the same for risk and ambiguity, as 
assumed by prospect theory, and sign-comonotonic trade-off consistency, the central condition of prospect 
theory, held.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Loss aversion, the assumption that people are more sensitive to losses than to commensurate gains, 
is a central element of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Tversky and Kahneman 1992) 
and key to explaining deviations from expected utility (Rabin 2000, pp. 1288-1289). There is 
abundant qualitative evidence for loss aversion, from both the lab and the field (Barberis 2013, Fox 
and Poldrack 2014, Wakker 2010). However, measuring loss aversion is difficult. It requires the 
simultaneous measurement of utility for gains and utility for losses, which is complicated by prospect 
theory’s assumption that decision weighting for gains and losses may differ. As a result, existing 
measurements of loss aversion impose simplifying assumptions, typically linear utility for gains and 
losses and no probability weighting.  
 
Abdellaoui et al. (2007) was the first to propose a method for measuring loss aversion that did not 
have to impose simplifying assumptions about utility or probability weighting. Their method is design
ed for decision under risk, where objective probabilities are known. In most real-world decisions (e.
g., the success of new medicines, the dangers of climate change, returns on investments in R&D), 
objective probabilities do not exist or are unknown and such decisions under ambiguity are now 
widely studied in both the empirical and the theoretical literature. It is difficult to extend the method 
of Abdellaoui et al. (2007) to decisions under ambiguity.1 
 
This paper introduces a method to measure loss aversion under ambiguity without making 
simplifying assumptions about prospect theory’s parameters. It makes it possible, for the first time, 
to completely observe Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) prospect theory.2 Parameter-free methods to 
measure prospect theory’s other parameters had been introduced before. Wakker and Deneffe 
(1996) showed how utility for gains and losses can be measured separately. Abdellaoui (2000) and 
Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000) showed how probability weights can be measured in decision under risk. 
Abdellaoui et al. (2005) showed how event weights can be measured in decision under ambiguity. 
Abdellaoui et al. (2007) showed how loss aversion can be measured in decision under risk. There did 
not yet exist a method to measure loss aversion under ambiguity and this is what our paper achieves. 
Hence, this paper completes a program to make prospect theory observable.  
 
                                                          
1
 This extension requires finding events with decision weight ½, which can be complex. 
2 Throughout this paper we use the term prospect theory for the 1992 version of the theory and the term 
original prospect theory (OPT) for the 1979 version. Because we only consider two-outcome prospects, OPT is 
the special case of prospect theory for decision under risk in which probability weighting for gains and losses 
are the same. 
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Our method is simple and uses only one response mode, which reduces the cognitive burden on 
subjects. It can quantify loss aversion through three preference elicitations and it does not require 
the complete measurement of utility. Our method is based on the trade-off method of Wakker and D
eneffe (1996). In its original form the trade-off method can only measure the utility for gains and the 
utility for losses separately and, consequently, it cannot measure loss aversion. We extend the trade-
off method so that it can measure the utility for gains and losses simultaneously, and thus loss aversi
on. This extension is not only useful from an empirical perspective, but also has theoretical merits. T
here is a close connection between measurements using the trade-off method and axiomatizations o
f decision theories (Köbberling and Wakker 2003). Our method may help to simplify existing preferen
ce characterization and to develop new ones.  
 
Because our method can completely measure prospect theory’s utility function, it also permits new t
ests of prospect theory. We implemented our method in an experiment and show that our measure
ments can easily be used to test the central condition of prospect theory, sign-comonotonic trade-off 
consistency. We also test whether both utility and loss aversion are the same under risk and ambiguit
y, as assumed by prospect theory. Our data is consistent with prospect theory. We could neither 
reject sign-comonotonic trade-off consistency nor in most cases the null hypotheses that utility and 
loss aversion were the same under risk and ambiguity. Utility had prospect theory’s hypothesized 
shape, concave for gains and convex for losses, and there was substantial loss aversion. 
 
2. Background 
2.1. Binary prospect theory 
Consider a decision maker who has to make a choice in the face of ambiguity. Ambiguity is modeled 
through a state space 𝑆. Exactly one of the states will obtain, but the decision maker does not know 
which one. Subsets 𝐸 of 𝑆 are events and 𝐸𝑐 denotes the complement of 𝐸.  
Prospects map states to outcomes. Outcomes are money amounts and more money is preferred to 
less. In our measurements, we will only use two-outcome prospects 𝑥𝐸𝑦, signifying that the decision 
maker obtains €𝑥 if event 𝐸 occurs and €𝑦 otherwise. If probabilities are known, we will write 𝑥𝑝𝑦 
for the prospect that pays €𝑥 with probability 𝑝 and €𝑦 with probability 1 − 𝑝. We will refer to 𝑥𝐸𝑦 
as an ambiguous prospect (meaning that probabilities are unknown) and to 𝑥𝑝𝑦 as a risky prospect 
(meaning that probabilities are known).  
The decision maker has preferences over prospects and we use the conventional notation ≻, ≽, and 
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∽ to denote strict preference, weak preference, and indifference. Preferences are defined relative to 
a reference point 𝑥0. Gains are payoffs higher than 𝑥0 and losses are payoffs lower than 𝑥0. A 
prospect is mixed if it involves both a gain and a loss. For mixed prospects, the notation 𝑥𝐸𝑦 signifies 
that 𝑥 is a gain and 𝑦 is a loss. A gain prospect involves no losses (i.e., both 𝑥 and 𝑦 are at least as 
great as 𝑥0) and a loss prospect involves no gains. For gain and loss prospects the notation 𝑥𝐸𝑦 
signifies that the absolute value of 𝑥 exceeds the absolute value of 𝑦 (i.e., for gains 𝑥 ≥ 𝑦 and for 
losses 𝑥 ≤ 𝑦).  
Under binary prospect theory (PT) the decision maker’s preferences over mixed prospects 𝑥𝐸𝑦 are 
evaluated by: 
𝑊+(𝐸)𝑈(𝑥) + 𝑊−(𝐸𝑐)𝑈(𝑦),       (1a) 
and preferences over gain or loss prospects by: 
𝑊𝑖(𝐸)𝑈(𝑥) + (1 − 𝑊𝑖(𝐸)) 𝑈(𝑦),      (1b) 
where 𝑖 = + for gains and 𝑖 = − for losses. 𝑈 is a strictly increasing, real-valued utility function that 
satisfies 𝑈(𝑥0) = 0. The utility function is a ratio scale and we are free to choose the utility of one 
outcome other than the reference point. 𝑈 is an overall utility function that includes loss aversion. In 
empirical applications 𝑈 is often decomposed in a basic utility function, which captures the decision 
maker’s attitudes towards final outcomes and which can be interpreted as the rational part of utility, 
and a loss aversion coefficient 𝜆 capturing attitudes towards gains and losses (Köbberling and 
Wakker 2005, Köszegi and Rabin 2006, Sugden 2003). Our method does not require this 
decomposition. However, it does allow to decompose 𝑈 into 𝑢, the basic utility function, and loss 
aversion 𝜆 if this is considered desirable.  
The event weighting functions 𝑊𝑖, 𝑖 = +, −, assign a number 𝑊𝑖(𝐸) to each event 𝐸 such that 
(i) 𝑊𝑖(∅) = 0 
(ii) 𝑊𝑖(𝑆) = 1 
(iii) 𝑊𝑖 is monotonic: 𝐸 ⊇ 𝐹 implies 𝑊𝑖(𝐸) ≥  𝑊𝑖(𝐹). 
The event weighting functions 𝑊𝑖 depend on the sign of the outcomes and may be different for 
gains and losses. They need not be additive. For gains, binary PT contains most ambiguity models as 
special cases,3 as was pointed out by Luce (1991) and Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001). These 
                                                          
3
 For example, Choquet expected utility (Schmeidler 1989), maxmin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler 
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ambiguity models only differ when the number of outcomes is at least three. Equations (1a) and (1b) 
represent the extension of these models to include sign-dependence. 
Binary PT evaluates mixed risky prospects 𝑥𝑝𝑦 by  
𝑤+(𝑝)𝑈(𝑥) + 𝑤−(1 − 𝑝)𝑈(𝑦)       (2a) 
and gain and loss risky prospects 𝑥𝑝𝑦 as 
𝑤𝑖(𝑝)𝑈(𝑥) + (1 − 𝑤𝑖(𝑝)) 𝑈(𝑦), 𝑖 = +, −.     (2b) 
𝑤𝑖 is a strictly increasing probability weighting function that satisfies 𝑤𝑖(0) = 0 and 𝑤𝑖(1) = 1 and 
that, again, may differ between gains and losses. Hence, in the evaluation of risky prospects the 
event weighting functions 𝑊𝑖 are replaced by probability weighting functions 𝑤𝑖. Equations (2a-b) 
include most theories of decision under risk as special cases.4 
 
2.2. Previous evidence 
Because we concentrate on utility and loss aversion in this paper, we will only discuss the empirical 
literature on these two elements of prospect theory. For an extensive review of the literature on 
probability weighting and event weighting see Wakker (2010) and Fox and Poldrack (2014). 
 Tversky and Kahneman (1992) assume that utility differs between gains and losses and is S-shaped: 
concave for gains and convex for losses. In addition, they assume that utility is steeper for losses 
than for gains, reflecting loss aversion. Nearly all the empirical evidence on utility comes from 
decision under risk. There is much evidence that utility for gains is indeed concave (Wakker 2010), 
but for losses the evidence is somewhat mixed. Although most studies found convex utility, some 
studies also found linear or concave utility (for example, Bruhin et al. 2010). For losses, utility usually 
was closer to linearity than for gains. 
Empirical evidence on utility under ambiguity is scarce. Abdellaoui et al. (2005) confirmed that utility 
under ambiguity was concave for gains and slightly convex for losses. Their parametric estimates 
were close to those previously obtained under risk, but they did not directly measure utility under 
risk. Abdellaoui et al. (2011) and Vieider et al. (2013) measured utility under risk and under 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1989), -maxmin expected utility (Ghirardato et al. 2004), and contraction expected utility (Gajdos et al. 2008).
4
 For example, original prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), rank-dependent expected utility 
(Quiggin 1981, Quiggin 1982), prospective reference theory (Viscusi 1989), and disappointment aversion 
theory (Gul 1991). 
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ambiguity for small stakes and under parametric assumptions about utility. Abdellaoui et al. (2011) 
found that utility was moderately concave for both risk and ambiguity, while Vieider et al. (2013) 
found linear utility.  
Nearly all empirical measurements of loss aversion made simplifying assumptions, typically assuming 
linear utility and either ignoring probability weighting (Baltussen et al. forthcoming, Booij and van de 
Kuilen 2009, Pennings and Smidts 2003)5 or assuming equal weighting for gains and losses (Gaechter 
et al. 2007). Of these studies, only Baltussen et al. (forthcoming) estimated loss aversion under both 
risk and ambiguity. They reported more loss aversion under ambiguity than under risk when subjects 
made their decision in public, but not when they did so in private. Abdellaoui et al. (2007) measured 
loss aversion under risk without imposing simplifying assumptions on either utility or probability 
weighting. To the best of our knowledge, such “clean” estimates of loss aversion do not exist for 
decision under ambiguity. 
Most studies found loss aversion coefficients around 2, meaning that losses weight approximately 
twice as much as absolutely commensurate gains (Booij et al. 2010, Fox and Poldrack 2014). A 
difficulty in comparing the results of these studies is that they not only made different parametric 
assumptions, but also used different definitions of loss aversion.  
 Finally, even though binary PT is consistent with much of the empirical data on decision under risk 
and ambiguity and includes many models as special cases, there is some evidence challenging it. For 
example, Birnbaum and Bahra (2007) and Wu and Markle (2008) obtained violations of binary PT for 
mixed prospects. Because of this negative evidence, we included a test of sign-comonotonic trade-
off consistency, the main condition underlying binary PT, in our experiment. This test is explained 
below. 
 
3. Measurement method 
Our method for measuring utility and loss aversion consists of three stages and is summarized in 
Table 1. In the first stage, a gain and a loss are elicited that connect utility for gains (measured in the 
second stage) with utility for losses (measured in the third stage). The measurements in the second 
and in the third stage employ the trade-off method of Wakker and Deneffe (1996). Within each 
domain, we determine a standard sequence of outcomes such that the utility difference between 
successive elements of the sequence is constant. The trade-off method is commonly used in decision 
                                                          
5Booij and van de Kuilen (2009) investigated the robustness of their findings by using probability weights 
estimated in other studies. 
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theory (Wakker 2010), but thus far it could only be used to measure utility for gains and utility for 
losses separately. It could not be used to measure loss aversion, which requires that the utility for 
gains and the utility for losses can be compared. Our method measures utility for gains and utility for 
losses jointly by eliciting a standard sequence of outcomes that goes through the reference point, 
and, consequently, it can measure loss aversion. In all the derivations presented below we impose 
no parametric assumptions on utility and the weighting functions 𝑊𝑖 and 𝑤𝑖, 𝑖 = +, −. Hence, our 
method is parameter-free. Our method only asks subjects to respond in terms of money and uses no 
other response scale. This reduces the cognitive demands on subjects. 
 
 
Table 1: Three-stage procedure to measure utility 
The third column shows the quantity that is assessed in each of the three stages of the procedure. The fourth column show
s the indifference that is elicited. The fifth column shows the stimuli used in our experiment. ℓ𝑎𝑙𝑡 and 𝑘𝐿𝑎𝑙𝑡  were used to tes
t binary PT (see Section 4 for explanation). 
 
  Assessed quantity Indifference Choice variables 
Stage 1  
𝐿 𝐺𝐸𝐿~𝑥0 𝐺 =  €2000 
𝐸 = color of a ball drawn 
from an unknown Ellsberg 
urn (for the case of risk we 
replace 𝐸 by 𝑝 = ½) 
𝑥0 = 0 
𝑥1
+ 𝑥1
+~𝐺𝐸𝑥0 
𝑥1
− 𝑥1
−~𝐿𝐸𝑐𝑥0 
Stage 2 Step 1 ℒ 𝑥1
+
𝐸
ℒ~ℓ𝐸𝑐𝑥0 ℓ = −€300 ; 𝑘𝐺 = 6 
ℓ𝑎𝑙𝑡 = €0; 𝑘𝐺𝑎𝑙𝑡 = 3  Step 2 to 𝑘𝐺 𝑥𝑗
+ 𝑥𝑗
+
𝐸
ℒ~𝑥𝑗−1
+
𝐸
ℓ 
Stage 3 Step 1 𝒢 𝒢𝐸𝑥1
−~ℊ𝐸𝑥0 ℊ = €300; 𝑘𝐿 = 6  Step 2 to 𝑘𝐿 𝑥𝑗
− 𝒢𝐸𝑥𝑗
−~ℊ𝐸𝑥𝑗−1
−  
 
 
3.1 First stage: connecting utility for gains and utility for losses 
We start by selecting an event 𝐸 that will be kept constant throughout the first stage and a gain 𝐺. 
Then we elicit the loss 𝐿 for which 𝐺𝐸𝐿~𝑥0. It follows from equation (1a) that: 
𝑊+(𝐸)𝑈(𝐺) + 𝑊−(𝐸𝑐)𝑈(𝐿) = 𝑈(𝑥0) = 0.     (3) 
We next elicit certainty equivalents 𝑥1
+ and 𝑥1
− such that 𝑥1
+~𝐺𝐸𝑥0 and 𝑥1
−~𝐿𝐸𝑐𝑥0. The indifference 
𝑥1
+~𝐺𝐸𝑥0 implies that 
𝑈(𝑥1
+) = 𝑊+(𝐸)𝑈(𝐺).        (4) 
The indifference 𝑥1
−~𝐿𝐸𝑐𝑥0 implies that 
𝑈(𝑥1
−) = 𝑊−(𝐸𝑐)𝑈(𝐿).       (5) 
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Combining Eqs. (3) (5) gives 
𝑈(𝑥1
+) = −𝑈(𝑥1
−).        (6) 
Equation (6) defines the first elements 𝑥1
+ and 𝑥1
− of the standard sequences of gains and losses that 
we will elicit in the second and third stages. 
For choice under risk, the elicitation of 𝑥1
+ and 𝑥1
− is similar except that the event 𝐸 is replaced by a 
known probability 𝑝, and that the weights 𝑊+(𝐸) and 𝑊−(𝐸𝑐) are replaced by 𝑤+(𝑝) and 
𝑤−(1 − 𝑝), respectively. 
3.2 Second stage: measurement of utility for gains  
In the second stage, we elicit a standard sequence of gains. Let ℓ be a prespecified loss. We first 
elicit the loss ℒ < ℓ such that the decision maker is indifferent between the prospects 𝑥1
+
𝐸
ℒ and 
ℓ𝐸𝑐𝑥0, where 𝑥1
+ is the gain that was elicited in the first stage. We may select an event 𝐸′ different 
from the event 𝐸 used in the first stage, but, for notational convenience, we will continue using the 
symbol 𝐸 for the selected event. In our experiment, we used the same event in all stages to simplify 
the tasks for the subjects. The indifference 𝑥1
+
𝐸
ℒ~ℓ𝐸𝑐𝑥0 implies that 
𝑊+(𝐸)𝑈(𝑥1
+) + 𝑊−(𝐸𝑐)𝑈(ℒ) = 𝑊−(𝐸𝑐)𝑈(ℓ) .    (7) 
Rearranging Eq. (7) and using 𝑈(𝑥0) = 0 gives, 
𝑈(𝑥1
+) − 𝑈(𝑥0) =
𝑊−(𝐸𝑐)
𝑊+(𝐸)
(𝑈(ℓ) − 𝑈(ℒ)).     (8) 
Next, we elicit the gain 𝑥2
+ such that 𝑥2
+
𝐸
ℒ~𝑥1
+
𝐸
ℓ. From this indifference we obtain after rearranging 
𝑈(𝑥2
+) − 𝑈(𝑥1
+) =
𝑊−(𝐸𝑐)
𝑊+(𝐸)
(𝑈(ℓ) − 𝑈(ℒ)).     (9) 
Combining Eqs. (8) and (9) gives : 
𝑈(𝑥2
+) − 𝑈(𝑥1
+) = 𝑈(𝑥1
+) − 𝑈(𝑥0).       (10) 
We proceed by eliciting a series of indifferences 𝑥𝑗
+
𝐸
ℒ~𝑥𝑗−1
+
𝐸
ℓ, 𝑗 = 2, … , 𝑘𝐺, to obtain the sequence 
{𝑥0, 𝑥1
+, 𝑥2
+, … , 𝑥𝑘𝐺
+ }. It is easy to see that for all 𝑗, 𝑈(𝑥𝑗
+) − 𝑈(𝑥𝑗−1
+ ) = 𝑈(𝑥1
+) − 𝑈(𝑥0). For decision 
under risk, we apply the above procedure with the event 𝐸 replaced by a probability 𝑝 (which can be 
different from the probability used in the first stage). 
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3.3 Third stage: measurement of utility for losses 
The standard sequence of losses is constructed similarly. We select a gain ℊ and an event 𝐸 and 
elicit the gain 𝒢 such that 𝒢𝐸𝑥1
−~ℊ𝐸𝑥0.6 We then proceed to elicit a standard sequence 
{𝑥0, 𝑥1
−, 𝑥2
−, … , 𝑥𝑘𝐿
− } by eliciting a series of indifferences 𝒢𝐸𝑥𝑗
−~ℊ𝐸𝑥𝑗−1
− , 𝑗 = 2, … , 𝑘𝐿 . For risk, we 
replace the event 𝐸 by a probability 𝑝 (which can be different from the probabilities used in the 
other two stages). 
By combining the second and the third stages we have elicited a sequence 
{𝑥𝑘𝐿
− , … , 𝑥1
−, 𝑥0, 𝑥1
+, … , 𝑥𝑘𝐺
+ } that runs from the domain of losses through the reference point to the d
omain of gains and for which the utility difference between successive elements is constant. We can 
scale utility by selecting the utility of an arbitrary element. In the analyses reported below, we set 
𝑈(𝑥𝑘𝐺
+ ) = 1 from which it follows that 𝑈(𝑥𝑗
+) = 𝑗 𝑘𝐺⁄  for 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑘𝐺, and 𝑈(𝑥𝑗
−) = − 𝑗 𝑘𝐺⁄ , for 
𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑘𝐿. 
 
 
 
4. Experiment 
We will next implement our method in an experiment. By exploring whether utility and loss aversion 
are the same for risk and ambiguity we test prospect theory. The experiment also contains a test of 
sign-comonotonic trade-off consistency, the central condition of prospect theory. 
 
4.1 Experimental set-up 
Subjects were 75 economics students of the Erasmus School of Economics, Rotterdam (29 female). 
Each subject was paid a flat fee of €10 for participation in the experiment. Before conducting the 
actual experiment, the experimental protocol was tested in several pilot sessions. 
The experiment was run on computers. Subjects answered the questions individually in sessions of 
at most two subjects. They first received instructions about the tasks and then completed five 
training questions. Subjects were told that there were no right or wrong answers and that they 
should go through the experiment at their own pace. They could approach the experimenter if they 
had any questions regarding the experiment. A session lasted 40 minutes on average. 
The order in which utility under risk and ambiguity were measured was randomized between 
                                                          
6
 Again, we may select an event 𝐸" different from the events employed in the other two stages. 
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sessions. When a subject had completed the first part of the experiment, the experimenter would 
approach her to explain the next part. Within the risk and ambiguity elicitations, the order in which 
the gain sequence and the loss sequence were elicited was also randomized. The first stage, the 
elicitation of the amounts 𝑥1
+ and 𝑥1
−, always came first because it served as an input for the other 
stages. 
We did not immediately ask subjects for their indifference values, but, instead, first used three 
binary choice questions to zoom in at them and only then asked subjects for their indifference value. 
Examples of this zooming-in procedure can be found in the Appendix. We applied a choice-based 
elicitation procedure as previous research suggests that it leads to more reliable results than directly 
asking for indifference values (Bostic et al. 1990). 
 
4.2 Details 
The method described in Section 3 requires the prior specification of some stimuli. The final column 
of Table 1 shows the stimuli we selected for the experiment. We made the common assumption that 
the reference point 𝑥0 was equal to 0. In the risk condition, the outcome of a prospect was 
determined by drawing a ball from an urn containing five red balls and five black balls. Subjects 
could state which color they preferred to bet on with the chance of winning always equal to 50 
percent. In the ambiguity condition, the outcome of a prospect was determined by drawing a ball 
from an urn containing ten red and black balls in unknown proportions. Again, subjects could select 
the color they preferred to bet on to avoid suspicion (Pulford 2009, Viscusi and Magat 1992).  
For both gains and losses, we elicited six points of the utility function under risk and six points of the 
utility function under ambiguity. Next to these elicitations, we performed a second smaller sequence 
in the domain of gains where we used a different gauge amount ℓ. In the main elicitation we set 
ℓ = −€300. In the second elicitation, where we only elicited 𝑥2
+ and 𝑥3
+, we set ℓ𝑎𝑙𝑡 = € 0. Under 
binary PT the elicitations of 𝑥2
+ and 𝑥3
+ should not depend on the selected value of ℓ. This second 
elicitation tested sign-comonotonic trade-off consistency (Köbberling and Wakker 2003).7 
 
 
                                                          
7 Kö bberling and Wakker (2003) define sign-cömönötönic trade-öff cönsistency förmally. In a nutshell, the 
cönditiön hölds because changing ℓ fröm −€300 intö €0 döes nöt change the rank-ördering and the sign 
(nö löss is turned intö a gain ör vice versa) öf each pröspect’s payöffs. Then utility differences shöuld nöt 
be affected accörding tö pröspect theöry.  
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Figure 1: Choice screen under ambiguity 
 
Figures 1-3 show the displays used under ambiguity. The screens under risk were similar, except that 
the two branches would simply say 50% rather than “Red” or “Black”. Figure 1 displays the typical 
decision that subjects had to make. Subjects faced a choice between two prospects denoted as 
alternatives A and B. They could not state indifference. By choosing between the two prospects, the 
subject narrowed down the interval in which her indifference value should fall.  
 
 
Figure 2: Scrollbar screen under ambiguity 
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After narrowing down the interval thrice, we presented subjects with a scrollbar (Figure 2). The 
scrollbar allowed subjects to specify their indifference value up to €1 precision. The range of the 
scrollbar was wider than the interval, so that subjects could correct any mistakes they might have 
made. The way in which subjects used the scrollbar also gives an indication of the quality of the data. 
If many subjects would provide answers that did not align with their previous choices, possibly even 
violating stochastic dominance, this signals poor understanding of the task. After specifying a value 
with the scrollbar, subjects were asked to confirm their choice (Figure 3). If they cancelled their 
choice, the process started over. If subjects confirmed their choice, they moved on to the next 
elicitation. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Confirmation screen under ambiguity 
 
 
 
4.3 Analyses 
 
4.3.1 Utility curvature 
Two different methods were used to investigate utility curvature. In the first, nonparametric, 
method, we calculated the area under the utility function. Both for gains and for losses, the domain 
of 𝑈 was normalized to [0,1] by transforming every gain 𝑥𝑗
+ to the value 𝑥𝑗
+ 𝑥6
+⁄  and every loss 𝑥𝑗
− to 
𝑥𝑗
− 𝑥6
−⁄ .8 If utility is linear, the area under this normalized curve equals ½. For gains, we define utility 
                                                          
8 Three subjects (two for risk and one for ambiguity) violated monotonicity so that 𝑥6
− was not the largest loss. 
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to be convex [concave] if the area under the curve is smaller [larger] than ½. For losses, utility is 
defined to be convex [concave] if the area under the curve is larger [smaller] than ½.  
We also analyzed the utility function by parametric estimation. We employed the power/constant 
relative risk aversion (CRRA) family, 𝑥𝛼, the most commonly used parametric family. For gains 
[losses] 𝛼 > 1 corresponds to convex [concave] utility, 𝛼 = 1 corresponds to linear utility, and 
𝛼 < 1 corresponds to concave [convex] utility. Estimation was by nonlinear least squares. We also 
performed a mixed-effects estimation in which each individual parameter was estimated as the sum 
of a fixed effect, common to all subjects, and an individual-specific random effect. The mixed-effects 
estimation led to the same conclusions and will therefore not be reported.  
A potential problem in estimating a model like binary PT is collinearity between utility and the event 
weights. The trade-off method avoids this problem. By keeping event weighting fixed during the 
elicitation of utility, the event weights drop from the equations and utility can be measured 
independent of event weighting. Hence, collinearity is completely excluded. This is an additional 
advantage of our method.  
 
4.3.2 Loss aversion 
There exist several definitions of loss aversion. Abdellaoui et al. 2007) concluded that the definitions 
of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Köbberling and Wakker (2005) were empirically most useful 
and we will use these. Other definitions (Wakker and Tversky 1993, Bowman et al. 1999, Neilson 
2002) turned out to be too strict for empirical purposes, leaving many subjects unclassified. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) defined loss aversion as – 𝑈(−𝑥) > 𝑈(𝑥) for all 𝑥 > 0. To measure 
loss aversion coefficients, we computed – 𝑈(−𝑥𝑗
+) 𝑈(𝑥𝑗
+)⁄  and – 𝑈(𝑥𝑗
−) 𝑈(−𝑥𝑗
−)⁄  for 𝑗 = 1, … ,6, 
whenever possible.9 Usually 𝑈(−𝑥𝑗
+) and 𝑈(−𝑥𝑗
−) could not be observed directly and had to be 
determined through linear interpolation. Some subjects occasionally violated stochastic dominance. 
In that case, it is impossible to estimate utility and we treated utility as missing for the amounts for 
which this happened. A subject was classified as loss averse if – 𝑈(−𝑥) 𝑈(𝑥)⁄ > 1 for all 
observations, as loss neutral if – 𝑈(−𝑥) 𝑈(𝑥)⁄ = 1 for all observations, and as gain seeking if 
– 𝑈(−𝑥) 𝑈(𝑥)⁄ < 1 for all observations. To account for response error, we also used a more lenient 
rule, classifying subjects as loss averse, loss neutral, or gain seeking if the above inequalities held for 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
For this subject we transformed losses 𝑥𝑗
− to 𝑥𝑗
− { min
𝑖=1,…,6
𝑥𝑖
−}⁄ . 
9
 These computations required that −𝑥𝑗
+ was contained in [𝑥6
−, 0) and −𝑥𝑗
− in (0, 𝑥6
+]. 
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more than half of the observations. 
Köbberling and Wakker (2005) defined loss aversion as the kink of utility at the reference point. 
Formally, they defined loss aversion as 𝑈↑
′(0) 𝑈↓
′(0)⁄ , where 𝑈↑
′(0) represents the left derivative and 
𝑈↓
′(0) the right derivative of 𝑈 at the reference point. To operationalize this definition, we 
computed each subject’s coefficient of loss aversion as the ratio of 𝑈(𝑥1
−) 𝑥1
−⁄  over 𝑈(𝑥1
+) 𝑥1
+⁄ , 
because 𝑥1
− and 𝑥1
+ are the loss and gain closest to the reference point. Given that 𝑈(𝑥1
−) =
 −𝑈(𝑥1
+), this ratio is equal to 𝑥1
+ −𝑥1
−⁄ . Hence, the first stage of our method immediately gives an 
estimate of Köbberling and Wakker’s (2005) loss aversion coefficient without the need to further 
measure utility. A subject was classified as loss averse if 𝑥1
+ −𝑥1
−⁄  > 1, as loss neutral if 𝑥1
+ −𝑥1
−⁄  = 1 
1, and as gain seeking if 𝑥1
+ −𝑥1
−⁄  < 1. 
 
5. Results 
For one subject the program crashed and we lost his data. Three subjects violated stochastic 
dominance in critical, early steps of the measurement procedure. Violations of stochastic dominance 
at these early measurements undermine subsequent answers and subjects committing them were 
removed from the analyses. For the remaining 71 subjects, we could determine the entire utility 
function, for both gains and losses and under both risk and ambiguity.  
 
5.1 Consistency checks 
We included a number of repetitions to test for consistency. First, in each of the six standard 
sequences (the short and the long gain sequences and the loss sequence for both risk and 
ambiguity), we repeated the final iteration in the elicitation of 𝑥2
𝑖 , 𝑖 =  +, −. Subjects made the same 
choice in 63.6% of the repeated choices. Reversal rates around ⅓ are common in the literature 
(Stott 2006). Moreover, our consistency test was strict as we repeated the final choice of the 
iteration process and subjects were close to indifference in this choice. There were no differences in 
consistency between risk and ambiguity.  
Furthermore, at the end of eliciting the long gain sequence, we elicited 𝑥4
+ again, both for risk and 
for ambiguity. The correlation between the original measurement and the repeated measurement of 
𝑥4
+ was almost perfect.10 For risk, Kendall’s  was 0.92, for ambiguity it was 0.94. 
As a final indication of consistency, we compared whether the final answer provided by using the 
                                                          
10
 We use the (standard) nomenclature of Landis and Koch (1977) to describe the strength of associations. 
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scrollbar fell within the interval as set up by the bisection procedure. Subjects provided answers that 
aligned with their original choices. Furthermore, when a subject’s final answer was outside the 
bisection interval, it typically only violated the final choice, probably indicating that they were close 
to indifference at this point. 
 
5.2 Sign-comonotonic trade-off consistency 
As explained in Section 4, we elicited two sequences of gains, a longer one based on ℓ = −€300, 
which we use in the main analysis, and a shorter one based on ℓ𝑎𝑙𝑡 = €0. If our subjects behaved 
according to binary PT and satisfied sign-comonotonic trade-off consistency, then the values of 𝑥2
+ 
and 𝑥3
+ in the short sequence should be equal to those obtained in the long sequence.  
We could not reject binary PT, for both risk and ambiguity. The correlation between the obtained 
values was substantial. For risk, Kendall’s  was 0.57 for 𝑥2
+ and 0.51 for 𝑥3
+. For ambiguity, these 
values were 0.70 for 𝑥2
+ and 0.64 for 𝑥3
+. All correlation coefficients differed from 0 (𝑝 < 0.001). 
Moreover, for ambiguity, we could not reject the null hypotheses that the values of 𝑥2
+ and 
𝑥3
+ obtained in the short sequence were equal to those obtained in the long sequence (Wilcoxon 
test, both 𝑝 > 0.72). For risk, the values of 𝑥2
+ differed marginally (𝑝 = 0.08), but the values of 𝑥3
+ did 
not differ (𝑝 = 0.19). Hence, even though 𝑥3
+ was chained to 𝑥2
+, the marginal difference for 𝑥2
+ did 
not carry over to 𝑥3
+. 
 
5.3 The utility for gains and losses 
Figure 4 shows the utility for gains and losses under risk (Panel A) and ambiguity (Panel B) based on 
the median data. At first sight, the utility functions are close. They are consistent with the typical 
finding of convex utility for losses and concave utility for gains. Furthermore, the utility functions are 
steeper for losses than for gains, indicating loss aversion. 
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Figure 4: The utility for gains and losses based on the median data.  
 
To investigate these patterns more thoroughly, we move to the individual level analysis. Table 2 show
s that the classification of subjects according to the shape of their utility function was very similar for 
risk and ambiguity and we could not reject the null hypothesis that the overall distribution of classific
ations between the two conditions was the same (Fisher’s exact test, 𝑝 = 0.97). The common pattern 
was S-shaped utility: concave for gains and convex for losses. Less than 20% of the subjects behaved 
according to the traditional assumption in decision theory that utility is concave throughout. 
 
Table 2: Classification of subjects according to the shape of their utility function  
The table classifies the subjects according to the shape of their utility function based on the area under the normalized utili
ty function. Panel A displays the results under risk. Panel B displays the results under ambiguity. 
 
Panel A: Risk  
 Losses  
Gains Concave Convex Linear  Total 
Concave 13 30 1  44 
Convex 15 8 1  24 
Linear 2 0 1  3 
Total 30 38 3  71 
 
Panel B: Ambiguity 
 Losses  
Gains Concave Convex Linear  Total 
Concave 13 30 0  43 
Convex 18 9 0  27 
Linear 1 0 0  1 
Total 32 39 0  71 
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The parametric results confirmed the above conclusions. Table 3 shows the medians of the estimated 
individual CRRA functions. Utility was mostly concave for gains and convex for losses. Under both risk 
and ambiguity, 31 subjects (44%) had S-shaped utility.  
 
Table 3: Summary of individual parametric fittings of utility 
The table depicts the results of fitting CRRA functions on each subject’s choices individually. Shown are the median and inte
rquartile range (IQR) for the resulting estimates.  
 
 Risk  Ambiguity 
 Gains Losses  Gains Losses 
Median 0.87 0.93  0.94 0.91 
IQR [0.62-1.07]  [0.63-1.16]  [0.72-1.17] [0.68-1.36] 
 
For losses, we could not reject the null hypothesis that utility curvature was the same for risk and am
biguity, neither for the area measure (Wilcoxon test, 𝑝 = 0.31), nor for the CRRA coefficients  
(𝑝 = 0.94). However, utility for gains was more concave under risk for both measures (both 𝑝 = 0.04). 
The utilities under risk and under ambiguity were moderately correlated: Kendall’s  was 0.41 for gai
ns and 0.46 for losses for the area measure, and 0.41 for gains and 0.42 for losses for the CRRA coeffi
cients. 
 
5.4. Loss aversion 
Figure 2 displays the relations between the medians of 𝑥𝑗
+ and −𝑥𝑗
− under risk and under ambiguity. 
An advantage of our method is that it immediately reveals that there is loss aversion in the sense of 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) when 𝑥𝑗
+ > −𝑥𝑗
−.11 As Figure 2 clearly shows, this held true for all j, 
under both risk and ambiguity. We obtain an aggregate measure of loss aversion by regressing the 
𝑥𝑗
+ on (−𝑥𝑗
−) . The 𝛽′𝑠 in Figure 2 display the coefficients from this regression. Both 𝛽′𝑠 (for risk and 
ambiguity) exceeded one (𝑡-test, 𝑝 < 0.01) and the values were close to those observed previously 
for risk (Fox and Poldrack 2014). We could not reject the hypothesis that the values of 𝛽 were the 
same for risk and ambiguity (𝑧-test, 𝑝 = 0.32). 
                                                          
11 For a given j, 𝑥𝑗
+ and 𝑥𝑗
− have the same absolute value of utility by construction, 𝑈(𝑥𝑗
+) = −𝑈(𝑥𝑗
−), and, thu
s, 𝑥𝑗
+ > −𝑥𝑗
− implies that 𝑈(𝑥𝑗
+) < −𝑈(−𝑥𝑗
+), consistent with Kahneman and Tversky’s definition of loss aversi
on (𝑈(𝑥)  <  −𝑈(−𝑥) for all x > 0). 
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Figure 5: The relation between median gains and median losses with the same absolute utility. Panel A displays the 
relation between median gains and losses under risk. Panel B displays this relation under ambiguity. The dashed line 
corresponds to the case where gains and losses of the same absolute utility would be equal. The straight line with slope  
corresponds to the best fitting linear equation. 
 
Moving to the individual level, we found that 𝑥𝑗
+ > −𝑥𝑗
− for all j (Wilcoxon test, all 𝑝 < 0.01), which is 
consistent with the existence of loss aversion à la Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Furthermore, 
𝑥𝑗
+ −𝑥𝑗
−⁄  did not differ between risk and ambiguity for any j (Wilcoxon test, all 𝑝 > 0.25), which is 
consistent with the hypothesis of prospect theory that loss aversion is the same under risk and under 
ambiguity.  
Table 4: Results under the two definitions of loss aversion 
The table depicts the results under the two definitions of loss aversion for both risk and ambiguity. The table displays how 
the coefficients are defined, their medians and interquartile ranges, and the number of loss averse, gain seeking, and loss 
neutral subjects. The numbers in parentheses for Kahneman and Tversky’s definition correspond to the case where 
response errors are not taken into account.  
 
Definition Coefficient Condition Median [IQR] Loss averse Gain seeking Loss neutral 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
−𝑈(−𝑥)
𝑈(𝑥)
 Risk 
2.21  
[1.06, 5.52] 
58(46) 10(6) 1(1) 
Ambiguity 
2.30  
[1.12, 7.29] 
53(49) 16(10) 0(0) 
Köbberling and Wakker (2005) 
𝑥1
+
−𝑥1
− 
Risk 
1.88  
[1.06, 4.50] 
56 12 3 
Ambiguity 
2.00  
[1.21, 6.50] 
56 14 1 
 
Table 4 shows the results of the individual analyses of loss aversion based on Kahneman and 
Tversky’s (1979) and Köbberling and Wakker’s (2005) definitions. The table clearly shows evidence of 
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loss aversion, irrespective of the definition used and regardless of whether we took response errors 
into account. According to both definitions, the median loss aversion coefficients for risk and 
ambiguity did not differ (Wilcoxon test, both 𝑝 > 0.26) and they were moderately correlated (both 
Kendall’s  > 0.37, 𝑝 < 0.001). 
The two measures of loss aversion were substantially correlated. Kendall’s  was 0.78 for risk and 
0.82 for ambiguity (all  𝑝 <  0.001 ). It is comforting to observe that these two distinct measures, 
one of a local nature and relying on a single kink in the slope of the utility function, and the other 
global and relying on different absolute utilities associated with the same absolute money amounts 
in the positive and negative domain, showed a high degree of consistency in classifying subjects. 
 
6. Discussion 
Our data is consistent with prospect theory. Both utility and loss aversion were close for risk and 
ambiguity, as assumed by prospect theory. The results also supported sign-comonotonic trade-off 
consistency, the central condition of prospect theory. Finally, utility was S-shaped, concave for gains 
and convex for losses and there was substantial loss aversion.  
An easy response strategy in measurements using the trade-off method is to let the outcomes of the 
standard sequence increase by the difference between the gauge outcomes (ℒ and ℓ in the 
sequence of gains 𝒢 and ℊ in the sequence of losses). This would bias the results in the direction of 
linear utility. We checked for this heuristic by counting the number of subjects for whom the 
outcomes of the standard sequence (approximately) increased by the difference between the gauge 
outcomes but found little evidence to support it.  
We used large payoffs because we were interested in studying both utility curvature and loss 
aversion. Utility curvature is typically modest over small intervals (Luce 2000, Wakker and Deneffe 
1996) and we were concerned that it would be hard to detect differences between utility under risk 
and ambiguity for small stakes. Because we used large losses, all choices were hypothetical. It is 
impossible to find subjects willing to participate in an experiment where they can lose substantial 
amounts of money. Because all but one of the questions involved losses, we could not play out one 
of the gain questions for real either, as subjects would know immediately which question would be 
played out for real. The literature on the importance of real incentives is mixed. Most studies found 
that for small to modest stakes there is little or no effect of using real instead of hypothetical choices 
for the kind of tasks that we asked our subjects to perform, except that hypothetical responses tend 
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to be noisier (Bardsley et al. 2010). 
Our method is chained (adaptive) in the sense that previous responses are used in the elicitation of 
subsequent choices. Chaining may lead to error propagation, where errors made in one particular 
choice affect later choices. We checked for the impact of error propagation using the simulation 
methods developed by Bleichrodt and Pinto (2000) and Abdellaoui et al. (2005). In both simulations, 
we confirmed the conclusions from those studies that the impact of error propagation on 
measurements using the trade-off method was negligible.12 We also repeated the parametric 
analysis of utility accounting for serial correlation in the error terms.13 The estimates were similar to 
the ones reported in Section 5. Hence, we conclude that the chained nature of our measurements 
did not affect the results. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In many real-world problems probabilities are unknown. To apply prospect theory to such decision 
situations requires methods to measure its parameters. This paper shows how utility and loss 
aversion can be measured in decision under ambiguity. Our method, for the first time, makes 
prospect theory completely observable. By combining our measurements with the method of 
Abdellaoui et al. (2005) all prospect theory’s parameters can be measured without imposing 
simplifying assumptions. Our paper completes a program to make prospect theory empirically 
observable. Our method allows new tests of prospect theory’s assumptions and an experimental 
implementation showed support for two of these assumptions: that sign-comonotonic trade-off 
consistency holds and that both utility and loss aversion are the same for risk and ambiguity. We 
hope that by providing a simple way to measure prospect theory our method will foster its 
applications. 
  
 
  
                                                          
12
 Bleichrodt et al. (2010) also concluded that error propagation was negligible in their measurements using the 
trade-off method. 
13
 We assumed that the error terms followed an AR(1) process 𝜖𝑡 + 𝜌𝜖𝑡−1 = 𝑢𝑡  with 𝑢𝑡 normally distributed wi
th expectation 0 and variance 𝜎2 and estimated this using generalized least squares.  
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Appendix: Three illustrations of the bisection method under risk. 
 
 Offered choices in  
elicitation 𝐿 
Offered choices in  
elicitation 𝑥1
+ 
Offered choices in  
elicitation 𝑥2
− 
1 0 vs. (2000, 0.5; -2000) (2000,0.5;0) vs. 1000 (300,0.5;-200) vs. (800,0.5;-700) 
2 0 vs. (2000, 0.5; -1000) (2000,0.5;0) vs.   500 (300,0.5;-200) vs. (800,0.5;-450) 
3 0 vs. (2000, 0.5; -1500) (2000,0.5;0) vs.   750 (300,0.5;-200) vs. (800,0.5;-325) 
Slider Start value: -1250 
Interval: [-2000,-500] 
Start value: 625 
Interval: [250,1000] 
Start value: -388 
Interval: [-576,-200] 
 
  
 22 
References 
Abdellaoui, M. (2000). Parameter-free elicitation of utility and probability weighting functions. 
Management Science, 46, 1497-1512. 
Abdellaoui, M., Baillon, A., Placido, L., Wakker, P. P. (2011). The rich domain of uncertainty: Source 
functions and their experimental implementation. American Economic Review, 101, 695-723.  
Abdellaoui, M., Bleichrodt, H., Paraschiv, C. (2007). Measuring loss aversion under prospect theory: 
A parameter-free approach. Management Science, 53, 1659-1674.  
Abdellaoui, M., Vossmann, F., Weber, M. (2005). Choice-based elicitation and decomposition of 
decision weights for gains and losses under uncertainty. Management Science, 51, 1384-1399.  
Baltussen, G., Van den Assem, M., Van Dolder, D. (forthcoming). Risky choice in the limelight. Review 
of Economics and Statistics.  
Barberis, N. C. (2013). Thirty years of prospect theory in economics: A review and assessment. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27, 173-196.  
Bardsley, N., Cubitt, R., Loomes, G., Moffatt, P., Starmer, C., Sugden, R. (2010). Experimental 
economics: Rethinking the rules. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.  
Birnbaum, M. H. & Bahra, J. P. (2007). Gain-loss separability and coalescing in risky decision making. 
Management Science, 53, 1016-1028.  
Bleichrodt, H., Cillo, A., Diecidue, E. (2010). A quantitative measurement of regret theory. 
Management Science, 56, 161-175.  
Bleichrodt, H. & Pinto, J. L. (2000). A parameter-free elicitation of the probability weighting function 
in medical decision analysis. Management Science, 46, 1485-1496.  
Booij, A. S., Van Praag, B. M. S., Van de Kuilen, G. (2010). A parametric analysis of prospect theory’s 
functionals for the general population. Theory and Decision, 68, 115-148.  
Booij, A. S. & van de Kuilen, G. (2009). A parameter-free analysis of the utility of money for the 
general population under prospect theory. Journal of Economic Psychology, 30, 651-666.  
Bostic, R., Herrnstein, R. J., Luce, R. D. (1990). The effect on the preference reversal of using choice 
indifferences. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 13, 193-212.  
Bowman, D., Minehart, D., Rabin, M. (1999). Loss aversion in a consumption-savings model. Journal 
of Economic Behavior and Organization, 38, 155-178.  
Bruhin, A., Fehr-Duda, H., Epper, T. (2010). Risk and rationality: Uncovering heterogeneity in 
probability distortion. Econometrica, 78, 1372-1412.  
Fox, C. R. & Poldrack, R. A. (2014). Prospect theory and the brain. In Paul Glimcher & Ernst Fehr 
(Eds.), Handbook of Neuroeconomics (2nd ed.) (pp. 533-567). New York: Elsevier.  
 23 
Gaechter, S., Johnson, E. J., Herrmann, A. (2007). Individual-level loss aversion in risky and riskless 
choice. IZA Discussion Paper No. 2961.  
Gajdos, T., Hayashi, T., Tallon, J. M., Vergnaud, J. C. (2008). Attitude toward imprecise information. 
Journal of Economic Theory, 140, 27-65.  
Ghirardato, P., Maccheroni, F., Marinacci, M. (2004). Differentiating ambiguity and ambiguity 
attitude. Journal of Economic Theory, 118, 133-173.  
Gilboa, I. & Schmeidler, D. (1989). Maxmin expected utility with a non-unique prior. Journal of 
Mathematical Economics, 18, 141-153.  
Gul, F. (1991). A theory of disappointment aversion. Econometrica, 59, 667-686.  
Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. 
Econometrica, 47, 263-291.  
Köbberling, V. & Wakker, P. P. (2003). Preference foundations for nonexpected utility: A generalized 
and simplified technique. Mathematics of Operations Research, 28, 395-423.  
Köbberling, V. & Wakker, P. P. (2005). An index of loss aversion. Journal of Economic Theory, 122, 
119-131.  
Köszegi, B. & Rabin, M. (2006). A model of reference-dependent preferences. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 121, 1133-1166.  
Landis, J. R. & Koch, G. G. (1977). The measurement of observer agreement for categorical data. 
Biometrics, 159-174.  
Luce, R. D. (2000). Utility of gains and losses: Measurement-theoretical and experimental 
approaches. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.  
Neilson, W. S. (2002). Comparative risk sensitivity with reference-dependent preferences. Journal of 
Risk and Uncertainty, 24, 131-142.  
Pennings, J. M. E. & Smidts, A. (2003). The shape of utility functions and organizational behavior. 
Management Science, 49, 1251-1263.  
Pulford, B. D. (2009). Is luck on my side? optimism, pessimism, and ambiguity aversion. The 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 62, 1079-1087.  
Quiggin, J. (1982). A theory of anticipated utility. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3, 
323-343.  
Quiggin, J. (1981). Risk perception and risk aversion among Australian farmers. Australian Journal of 
Agricultural Economics, 25, 160-169.  
Rabin, M. (2000). Risk aversion and expected-utility theory: A calibration theorem. Econometrica, 68, 
1281-1292.  
 24 
Schmeidler, D. (1989). Subjective probability and expected utility without additivity. Econometrica, 
57, 571-587.  
Stott, H. P. (2006). Cumulative prospect theory's functional menagerie. Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty, 32, 101-130.  
Sugden, R. (2003). Reference-dependent subjective expected utility. Journal of Economic Theory, 
111, 172-191.  
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of 
uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 297-323.  
Vieider, F. M., Cingl, L., Martinsson, P., Stojic, H. (2013). Separating attitudes towards money from 
attitudes towards probabilities: Stake effects and ambiguity as a test for prospect theory. 
Working Paper, WZB Berlin.  
Viscusi, W. K. & Magat, W. A. (1992). Bayesian decisions with ambiguous belief aversion. Journal of 
Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 371-387.  
Viscusi, W. K. (1989). Prospective reference theory: Toward an explanation of the paradoxes. Journal 
of Risk and Uncertainty, 2, 235-264.  
Wakker, P. P. (2010). Prospect theory: For risk and ambiguity. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University 
Press.  
Wakker, P. P. & Deneffe, D. (1996). Eliciting von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities when probabilities 
are distorted or unknown. Management Science, 42, 1131-1150.  
Wakker, P. P. & Tversky, A. (1993). An axiomatization of cumulative prospect theory. Journal of Risk 
and Uncertainty, 7, 147-176.  
Wu, G. & Markle, A. B. (2008). An empirical test of gain-loss separability in prospect theory. 
Management Science, 54, 1322-1335.  
 
